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Abstract. We propose an efficient four-intensity decoy-state BB84 protocol and derive concise security
bounds for this protocol with the universally composable finite-key analysis method. Comparing with the
efficient three-intensity protocol, we find that our efficient four-intensity protocol can increase the secret key
rate by at least 30%. Particularly, this increasing rate of secret key rate will be raised as the transmission
distance increases. At a large transmission distance, our efficient four-intensity protocol can improve the
performance of quantum key distribution profoundly.
PACS. 03.67.Dd Quantum cryptography and communication security – 03.67.Hk Quantum communica-
tion
1 Introduction
Combining with one time pad [1], quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [2,3] can offer a private communication with
an information-theoretical security [4,5,6,7]. In practical
QKD implementations, a weak pulsed laser source is uti-
lized in place of an ideal single-photon source. To deal
with the security vulnerability coming from the multi-
photon components of emitted laser pulses [8,9], decoy-
state method is proposed [10,11,12]. With this method,
the secure single-photon contribution can be estimated ef-
fectively.
In asymptotic setting (with infinitely long keys), the
security of decoy-state QKD is analyzed [11,12]. In the
case of finite-length keys, security bounds against general
attacks are first derived in Ref. [13]. Subsequently, Ref.
[14] derives concise and tight finite-key security bounds
for efficient three-intensity decoy-state protocol by com-
bining the recent security proof technique [15,16] with a
finite-key analysis for decoy-state method. The simulation
results show that these bounds are relatively tight.
Four-intensity decoy-state protocols are researched in
[17,18,19,20]. However, in their works, the four different
intensities are mainly used to obtain a tighter estimation
formula for single-photon error rate [18,19] and the se-
cret key rates are calculated in asymptotic setting. For
practical QKD implementations, the effects due to finite-
length keys should be considered, e.g., statistical fluctua-
tion [13,14,21]. Thus, in finite-key setting, statistical fluc-
tuations of four different measurement values (the num-
bers of quantum bit errors) should be taken into account
when four intensities are all utilized for one estimation
a E-mail: gaoming.zhengzhou@gmail.com
formula of single-photon error rate [18,19], which may in
contrary bring a lower secret key rate especially when the
transmission distance is large.
Here, we propose an efficient four-intensity decoy-state
QKD protocol with biased basis choice. Unlike previous
four-intensity protocols, in this protocol, the basis choice
is biased and the estimation method for single-photon con-
tribution is the same with the widely used one [14,22]. Ad-
ditionally, different from efficient three-intensity protocols
[14,23,24], the intensities and the bases in our protocol
are independent except the lowest intensity. More specif-
ically, in our protocol, Z basis is used for key generation
where three different intensities are utilized, and X ba-
sis is used for testing where two different intensities are
used [25]. The two higher intensities in Z basis (except
lowest intensity) are independent from the higher inten-
sity in X basis. Compared with efficient three-intensity
protocols, the intensities in our protocol can be freely op-
timized to increase the detected pulses in two bases (for a
fixed number of sent pulses N) and decrease the statistical
deviations caused by finite-length key.
Using the universally composable finite-key analysis
method [14], we derive concise security bounds for our ef-
ficient four-intensity protocol. With these bounds and sys-
tem parameters in Ref. [14], we perform some numerical
simulations with full parameter optimization. When the
number of sent pulses N is 109, compared with efficient
three-intensity protocol [14], our protocol can increase the
secret key rate by at least 30%. Particularly, this increas-
ing rate of secret key rate will be raised with the increasing
transmission distance.
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2 Protocol description
In this paper, we consider the efficient BB84 protocol [25],
i.e., the basis choice is biased. Our protocol is based on the
transmission of phase-randomized laser pulses, and uses
four different-intensity setting. Then, we describe our ef-
ficient four-intensity protocol in detail.
1. Preparation and measurement. Alice sends four dif-
ferent kinds of weak laser pulses with intensities ω, υ1, υ2, µ
(µ > υ1 + ω, υ1 > ω ≥ 0, υ2 > ω ≥ 0), with probabilities,
Pω, Pυ1 , Pυ2 and Pµ (Pω + Pυ1 + Pυ2 + Pµ = 1), respec-
tively. Specially, the pulses with intensities (υ1 and µ) are
all prepared in Z basis, the pulses with intensity υ2 are
all prepared in X basis, and the pulses with the lowest
intensity ω are prepared in Z(X) basis with probability
PZ|ω(PX|ω) (PZ|ω + PX|ω = 1). Bob chooses Z(X) ba-
sis to perform the measurement with probability PZ(PX)
(PZ + PX = 1).
2. Basis reconciliation and parameter estimation. Al-
ice and Bob announce their basis choices over an authen-
ticated public channel, and accomplish the sifting by re-
serving the detected signals with the same basis and dis-
carding the others. After this procedure, Alice and Bob
share two bit strings with lengths nZ and nX correspond-
ing to two bases. Then, Alice announces the intensity in-
formation. Based on that, the shared bit string in Z basis
can be divided into three substrings with lengths, nZ,ν
(ν ∈ {µ, υ1, ω}), where nZ =
∑
ν∈{µ,υ1,ω}
nZ,ν . As for X ba-
sis, Alice and Bob need to announce their bit strings. They
compare them and obtain the numbers of bit error, mX,k
(k ∈ {υ2, ω}). With these nZ,ν and mX,k, they can calcu-
late the number of vacuum events sZ,0 [Eq. (2)], the num-
ber of single-photon events sZ,1 [Eq. (4)] and the phase er-
ror rate ePZ1 [Eq. (8)] associated with single-photon events
in Z basis.
3. Error correction and privacy amplification. In the
error-correction step, we assume that the error rate EZ is
predetermined and at most λEC = fnzH(Ez) is revealed,
where f is error-correction efficiency; H(x) = −xlog2(x)−
(1 − x)log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon entropy func-
tion. Next, an error verification is performed to ensure
that Alice and Bob share a pair of identical keys. εcor is
the probability that a pair of nonidentical keys pass this
error-verification step. Finally, they perform the privacy
amplification to extract the εsec-secret keys with length l
[Eq. 1].
3 Security bounds for efficient four-intensity
protocol
Following the finite-key security analysis in Ref. [14], the
length of εsec-secret key l is given by
l = ⌊sZ,0 + sZ,1[1−H(ePZ1 )]
−λEC − 6log2 17εsec − log2 2εcor ⌋. (1)
Then the secret key rate R is l/N , where N is the num-
ber of pulses sent by Alice. sZ,0 sZ,1 and e
PZ
1 are, re-
spectively, the number of vacuum events, the number of
single-photon events and the phase error rate associated
with single-photon events in Z basis. The values of these
three parameters need to be estimated with decoy-state
method instead of being measured from the experiment
directly. The estimation formulas of sZ,0, sZ,1 and e
PZ
1
are the same with the ones in Ref. [14].
It should be noted that the estimation of the number
of single-photon events in X basis sX,1 in our protocol is
different from the one in Ref. [14]. From Eq.(8), one can
see that in order to accomplish the calculation of ePZ1 ,
sX,1 needs to be estimated first. In Ref. [14], sX,1 is esti-
mated by using Eqs. (2) and (4) with statistics from the
X basis. Thus, the bounds n−X,ω, n
+
X,υ1
, n−X,υ1 , n
+
X,ω and
n+X,µ should be estimated from the measurement values
of nX,ω, nX,υ1 and nX,µ in X basis, which leads to 5 er-
ror terms [14]. Different from the protocol in [14], only
two intensities are used in X basis in our protocol. Here,
we assume that the yields of single-photon state in two
bases are equal in asymptotic setting1. Then, in finite-
key setting, sX,1 can be estimated from sZ,1 by using the
random-sampling theory (without replacement) [26] and
the result is shown in Eq. (5). In this case, only 1 error
term arises when sX,1 is estimated.
Such a change of the estimation method of sX,1 causes
a minor modification on the secret key rate formula [Eq.
(1)]. According to the Eq. (B4) in Ref. [14], 21 error terms
emerge during the secrecy analysis for the efficient three-
intensity protocol, where 5 error terms come from the es-
timation of sX,1. In our protocol, sX,1 is estimated with
sZ,1, where 1 error term needs to be taken into considera-
tion. Therefore, only 17 error terms need to be composed
into the secrecy parameter εsec when we apply the same
secrecy analysis method in [14] to our protocol. Then, we
set each error term to a common value εsec17 and this value
is used in both our secret key rate formula [Eq. (1)] and
finite-size decoy-state analysis [Eqs. (3, 5, 7, 8)]. Next,
we will show how to estimate sZ,0, sZ,1 and e
PZ
1 in our
protocol.
sZ,0 is given by
sZ,0 ≥ τZ,0
υ1n
−
Z,ω − ωn+Z,υ1
υ1 − ω , (2)
where τZ,i =
∑
k∈{µ,υ1,ω}
PkPZ|ke−kki
/
i! is the probability
that Alice sends an i-photon pulse in Z basis, Pk and
PW |k are the probability to choose intensity k and the
conditional probability to choose W basis (W ∈ {Z,X})
conditional on k, and
n±Z,k =
ek
PkPZ|k
[nZ,k±
√
nZ
2
ln
17
εsec
], (k ∈ {µ, υ1, ω}). (3)
sZ,1 can be calculated by
1 This is normally satisfied when all the detectors have the
same parameters (dark count rate, detection efficiency and
after-pulse probability) and are operating according to spec-
ification.
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sZ,1 ≥
τZ,1µ[n
−
Z,υ1
− n+Z,ω − υ
2
1
−ω2
µ2
(n+Z,µ − sZ,0τZ,0 )]
µ(υ1 − ω)− υ21 + ω2
. (4)
By using a random sampling without replacement [26],
sX,1 can be obtained by
sX,1 ≥ NX1
sZ,1
NZ1
− 2NX1 g(NX1 , NZ1 ,
sZ,1
NZ1
,
εsec
17
), (5)
where NW1 = NτW,1PW , C(x, y, z) = exp(
1
8(x+y) +
1
12y −
1
12yz+1 − 112y(1−z)+1 ),
g(x, y, z, ε) =
√
2(x+y)z(1−z)
xy
log
√
x+yC(x,y,z)√
2pixyz(1−z)ε .
The number of bit errors vX,1 associated with the single-
photon events in X basis is given by
vX,1 ≤ τX,1
m+X,υ2 −m−X,ω
(υ2 − ω) , (6)
where τX,1 =
∑
k∈{υ2,ω}
PkPX|ke−kk, mX = mX,υ2 +mX,ω,
m±X,k =
ek
PkPX|k
[mX,k ±
√
mX
2
ln
17
εsec
], k ∈ {υ2, ω}. (7)
e
pz
1 is computed by
e
pz
1 =
cZ,1
sZ,1
≤ vX,1
sX,1
+ γ(
εsec
17
,
vX,1
sX,1
, sX,1, sZ,1), (8)
where γ(a, b, c, d) =
√
(c+d)(1−b)b
cd log 2 log2(
(c+d)
cd(1−b)ba2 ).
4 Numerical simulation
To make a comparison with the efficient three-intensity
protocol, we perform some numerical simulations for the
fiber-based QKD system with the system parameters in
[14], shown in Table 1. These parameters come from re-
cent decoy-state QKD and single-photon detector exper-
iments [27,28]. More specifically, the intensity of weakest
decoy state ω = 2 × 10−4 and the misalignment error
rate emis = 5 × 10−3 are all from the experiment work
in [27]. Bob uses an active measurement setup with two
single-photon detectors and they have a detection effi-
ciency ηB = 0.1, a dark count rate pdc = 6× 10−7, and an
after-pulse probability pap = 0.04 [28]. The dedicated op-
tical fiber is used for quantum channel and the attenuation
coefficient of the fibers is 0.2 dB/km. For simulation, EZ is
set to be the average of the observed error rates in Z basis
and the error-correction efficiency f is set to be 1.16. In
practice, the cost of error correction λEC is the size of the
information exchanged during the error correction step.
Regarding the secrecy, we also set εsec to be proportional
to the key length l, that is, εsec = κl where κ is a security
constant and can be seen as the secrecy leakage per bit in
final key. To reduce the optimization complexity, we set
Table 1. List of parameters for numerical simulations. pdc
is the dark count rate; pap is the after-pulse probability; ω
is the lowest intensity; κ is the security constant; εcor is the
probability that shared secret keys are nonidentical; emis is the
misalignment error rate; ηB is the detection efficiency.
pdc pap ω κ εcor emis ηB
6× 10−7 0.04 2× 10−4 10−15 10−15 5× 10−3 0.1
Table 2. Comparison of parameters at 100 km (standard
fiber) between efficient three-intensity protocol [14] and our ef-
ficient four-intensity protocol. More general comparison results
are shown in Fig. 1. The second and third columns are, respec-
tively, optimal parameters for efficient three-intensity proto-
col and efficient four-intensity protocol. Compared with the
efficient three-intensity protocol at 100 km, our efficient four-
intensity protocol can increase key rate by 60%.
Efficient Efficient
Parameters three-intensity four-intensity
µ 0.551 0.47
υ1 0.188 0.183
υ2 −− 0.32
Pµ 0.127 0.16
Pυ1 0.599 0.407
Pυ2 −− 0.22
PZ 0.669 0.82
R 9.58× 10−6 1.53 × 10−5
PZ|ω = PZ . The parameters {µ, υ1, υ2, Pµ, Pυ1 , Pυ2 , PZ}
are optimized to maximize the secret key rate.
We set N to be 109 and compare the secret key rates
of the efficient three-intensity protocol and our efficient
four-intensity protocol. The results are shown in Fig. 1.
Compared with the efficient three-intensity protocol, our
protocol can increase secret key rate by at least 30% at all
transmission distances. The increasing rates of secret key
rate at different transmission distances are shown in Fig.
2. We can find that this increasing rate is monotonically
increasing with the transmission distance. That is, the ad-
vantage of our efficient four-intensity protocol is more sig-
nificant at a large transmission distance. Particularly, at
100 km, the increasing rate is 60% and the optimal param-
eters and secret key rates are shown in Table 2. Addition-
ally, we have also performed simulations with other sta-
tistical fluctuation analyses, including the standard error
analysis [29] and the Chernoff bound [30,31], and obtain
the same conclusion that the secret key rate is increased
with our protocol and the improvement is more significant
at a large transmission distance.
Compared with the efficient three-intensity protocol,
the secret key rate improvement of our efficient four-intensity
protocol mainly comes from the following two aspects:
(I) In efficient three-intensity protocol, the intensity υ1
in Z basis and the intensity υ2 in X basis are replaced by
the same intensity υ, and this intensity υ participates in
the calculations of both sZ,1 [Eq. (4)] and vX,1 [Eq. (6)].
In asymptotic setting, the optimal estimations of sZ,1 and
4 Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle
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Fig. 1. (Color online) Secret key rate vs fiber length (ded-
icated fiber). Numerically optimized secret key rates are ob-
tained for a fixed number of pulses sent by Alice N = 109. The
optimal parameters at the transmission distance of 100 km
are shown in Table 2. The blue dashed line shows the secret
key rates of efficient three-intensity protocol [14]. The secret
key rates of efficient four-intensity protocol are presented by
the red solid line. Compared with the efficient three-intensity
protocol, our efficient four-intensity protocol can increase the
secret key rate by at least 30%. Particularly, this improvement
is more significant when the transmission distance is large. The
increasing rates of secret key rate at different transmission dis-
tances are shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. (Color online) The increasing rate of secret key rate vs
fiber length (dedicated fiber). The red solid line shows the in-
creasing rate of secret key rate between efficient four-intensity
protocol and efficient three-intensity protocol. This increas-
ing rate is monotonically increasing with the transmission dis-
tance.
vx,1 are obtained when the intensity υ is infinitesimal [22].
Nonetheless, in finite-key setting, with statistical fluctua-
tion [Eqs. (3,7)] into consideration, the optimal intensity
υ, where the best estimation of sZ,1 is achieved, may not
help to get a tight estimation of vX,1. Therefore, in our
protocol, we make the intensities (υ1 and υ2) independent
by adding another intensity. From Table 2, the optimal in-
tensity υ1 and the optimal intensity υ2 are, severally, 0.183
and 0.32. They are quite different. In a word, the separate
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Optimal PZ vs fiber length (dedicated
fiber). The blue dashed line shows the optimal PZs of efficient
three-intensity protocol [14]. The optimal PZs of our efficient
four-intensity protocol are shown by red solid line. From the
results, we can see that our efficient four-intensity protocol al-
ways has a higher PZ than the efficient three-intensity protocol.
optimization of υ1 and υ2 helps to achieve a higher key
rate.
(II) Compared with standard balanced-basis protocol,
efficient protocol can highly improve the secret key rate
[14,23,24,25]. In asymptotic setting, the increasing rate
of secret key rate can reach 100%, when PZ approaches 1
[25]. However, in finite-key setting, compared to standard
three-intensity protocol with balanced basis choice, the ef-
ficient three-intensity protocol can increase secret key rate
by 45% [23]. As the transmission distance increases, the
improvement of secret key rate will decrease. That is be-
cause at a larger transmission distance, more pulses in X
basis are needed to give an accurate estimation of vX,1 in
Eq. (6) and Bob has to increase PX . When PX approaches
0.5, the efficient protocol becomes similar to the standard
one, where PZ = PX = 0.5. In our protocol, we subtly
add an additional intensity and make υ1 and υ2 indepen-
dent. As Table 2 shows, we can increase the intensity υ2 to
make the estimation of vX,1 more accurate. That is, with
an additional variable to reduce the statistical fluctuation,
efficient four-intensity protocol can help to get a higher
probability PZ to choose Z basis for key generation. The
optimal PZs for these two protocols at different transmis-
sion distances are shown in Fig. 3. From Fig. 3, one can
see that for these two protocols the optimal PZs are all
monotonically decreasing with the transmission distance.
Nevertheless, the optimal PZ of our protocol is always
larger than the one of efficient three-intensity protocol.
This is the other important factor which leads to a higher
secret key rate.
Note that the intensity ω of weakest decoy state in
our simulations is set to be 2× 10−4 instead 0 (a vacuum
state). That is because, in practice, it is usually difficult to
create a perfect vacuum state in decoy-state QKD exper-
iments [32,33], although it is optimal to set the weakest
decoy state to be vacuum state [22]. In Ref. [14], Lim et al.
choose the experiment parameter ω = 2×10−4 of Ref. [27]
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Secret key rate vs the weakest decoy
state ω. The optimized secret key rates are obtained for dif-
ferent transmission distances (20 km, 40 km, 60 km, 80 km,
100km, from top to bottom). All the solid lines show the re-
sults of our efficient four-intensity protocol, e.g., the black solid
line shows the optimized secret key rates of our protocol for
a fixed transmission distance 20 km. The results of efficient
three-intensity protocol [14] are all presented in dashed lines.
From these results, we find that as long as the intensity ω is
below 1× 10−3, the secret key rates of both the efficient three-
intensity protocol and our efficient four-intensity protocol are
stable, and our protocol has such an increasing rate of secret
key rate as more than 30% in comparison with the efficient
three-intensity protocol at all transmission distances.
to perform the numerical simulations. Following their sim-
ulation work, we also set ω = 2× 10−4. However, what is
the effect of the intensity of the weakest decoy state on the
secret key rate? Here, we further optimize the secret key
rate over the free ω. The results are shown in Fig. 4. We
find that as long as the intensity ω is below 1× 10−3, the
secret key rates of both the efficient three-intensity pro-
tocol and our efficient four-intensity protocol are stable.
That is, a perfect vacuum state is not essentially required
in practical decoy-state QKD experiments. Meanwhile, we
also find that even when the intensity ω is free, our proto-
col can still increase the secret key rate by more than 30%
in comparison with the efficient three-intensity protocol
in Ref. [14] at all transmission distances.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Actually, in terms of current finite-key analysis for decoy-
state method, our idea that the intensities and the bases
should be independent can be further exploited. Note that
the intensity ω also participates in the calculations of both
sZ,1 in Z basis and vX,1 in X basis, and we can add the
fifth intensity to make the intensities (ω1 in Z basis and
ω2 in X basis) in two bases independent. From Eq. (8), we
can see that when the numbers of single-photon events in
two bases are close, the sample deviation is small. Then
the sixth intensity, e.g., with an average number of pho-
tons of order 1 in X basis, is needed to make the numbers
of single-photon events in two bases close. However, in
practical implementations, setting more than four differ-
ent intensities is hard for experimentalists. Our efficient
four-intensity protocol is feasible and practical for current
technology.
In summary, we propose an efficient four-intensity pro-
tocol and provide concise finite-key security bounds for
this protocol that are valid against general attacks. Com-
pared with the efficient three-intensity protocol, our effi-
cient four-intensity protocol can increase secret key rate
by at least 30%. Particularly, at a large transmission dis-
tance, the improvement is more significant.
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